We propose and implement a new test of the dividend signaling hypothesis that is designed to discriminate between dividend signaling and other theories that would account for the apparent existence of a dividend preference. Our test refines the use of data on stock price responses to dividend announcements. In particular, we study the effect of dividend taxation on the bang-for-the-buck, which we define as the share price response per dollar of dividends.
Introduction
Economists have proposed numerous theories designed to explain corporate dividend policy. Different views about dividend policy lead to strikingly different conclusions about issues such as the cost of capital and the effects of tax policy. It is, therefore, important to distinguiah between these theories on the basis of empirical evidence. Unfortunately, this task has proven difficult.
In an attempt to test various theories of corporate dividend policy, Poterba and Summers (1983 , 1985 assembled evidence on the relative market value of dividends and capital gains, the effect of dividend taxation on dividend payout, and the effect of dividend taxation on investment. Their evaluation of this evidence was favorable to a "traditional view" of dividends, in which firms derive an advantage from the payment of dividends, and where this advantage is reflected in market value. This class of theories is obviously very broad, and includes (among other things) the possibility that firms pay dividends to signal private information about profitability,1 the hypothesis that dividends provide a mechanism for restricting managerial discretion,2 and the conjecture that investors prefer dividends for non-traditional, behavioral reasons.3
The fact that stock prices rise when companies announce plans to increase dividends, and fall when companies reveal that they intend to cut dividends, 1 See e.g. Bhattacharys (1979 Bhattacharys ( , 1980 , Haksnsson (1982) , Miller and Rock (1985) , Kumar (1988) , Kumar end Spatt (1987) , John and Williams (1985) , Ambarish, John, and Williams (1987) , John and Nachman (1987) , and Bernheim (1991). 2 See Jensen and Meckling (1976) . 3 See Shefrin and Statmsn (1984) .
1 is often cited as evidence for the theory that dividends signal profitability.4 Unfortunately, this evidence does not distinguish between the hypothesis that tha dividend conveys good news, snd the hypothesis that the dividend is the good news. Thus, although studies of dividend announcement effects lend additional support to Poterba and Summers' "traditional view," they do not allow us to differentiate between dividend signaling and other explanations for a dividend preference.
Under the dividend signaling hypothesis, firms that pay high levels of dividends should be more profitable than otherwise identical firms (from the point of view of the investor) that pay lower levels of dividends. This observation suggests that one can teat the signaling theory by examining the extent to which current dividends help to predict future earnings. Several early studies (Watts (1973) and Conedes (1978) ) concluded that dividends are essentially unrelated to subsequent earnings. However, a more recent study by Ofer and Siegel (1987) found that analysts revise their earnings forecasts in response to unanticipated dividend changes, and moreover that these revisions are rational.
Another empirical strategy was proposed by Lang and Litzenberger (1989) .
These authors argued that, under the managerial discipline hypothesis, dividend announcements should have larger, positive effects on share price when firma are overinvesting. This suggests that one should find larger share price responses among firms that have lower values of Tobin's Q. Lang and Litzenberger present data that are consistent with this prediction, and
The literature on stock price responses to announcements of changes in dividend policy includes papers by Pettit (1972 Pettit ( , 1977 , Laub (1976) , Charest (1978) , Aharony and Swary (1980) , Asquith and Mullins (1983) , Eades (1982) , Brickley (1983) , Kane, Lee, and Marcus (1984) , and Eades, Hess, and Kim (1983) . conclude that the data on share price responses to dividend announcements support the managerial discipline hypothesis, rather than dividend signaling.
From the preceding discussion, it is clear that the existing evidence is mixed; the literature has not succeeded in resolving the importance of dividend signaling relative to other variants of the "traditional" view. In thia paper, we contribute to this debate by proposing and implementing a new test of dividend signaling that is designed to discriminate between signaling and other theories of dividend preference. Our test refines the use of data on stock price responses to dividend announcements. In particular, we study the effect of dividend taxation on the -"bang-for-the-buck," which we define as the share price response per dollar of dividends. Most dividend signaling models imply that an increase in dividend taxation should increase the bang-for-the-buck. On the other hand, other dividend preference theories imply that an increase in dividend taxation should decrease the bang-for-the-buck. Since there has recently been considerable variation in the tax treatment of dividends, we are able to study dividend announcement effects under different tax regimes. Our central finding is that there is a strong positive relationship between dividend tax rates and the bang-for-the-buck. This result supports the dividend signaling hypothesis, and is inconsistent with alternative theories of a dividend preference, such as the managerial discipline hypothesis.
Our analysis of tax effects suggests a much broader strategy for testing the dividend signaling hypothesis. The dividend tax rate is simply one example of a publicly observed factor that is positively correlated with the marginal costs of paying dividends. Under the dividend signaling hypothesis, the bang-for-the-buck will tend to be high when observable information suggests that the marginal costs of paying dividends is high; the alternative hypotheses have the opposite implication. There are many publicly observed variables that are probably correlated with the marginal costs of paying dividends. One obvious candidate is a firm's bond rating. Our empirical analysis reveals a negative relationship between bond ratings and the bang-for-the-buck. Since the marginal cost of dividends is presumably low when the bond rating is high, this result corroborates our central finding:
the bang-for-the-buck is high when, on the basis of public information, a rational investor would expect dividends to be costly. This finding provides additional support for the dividend signaling hypothesis.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we explore the relationship between dividend taxation and the bang-for-the-buck under several alternative theories of corporate dividend policy. Our empirical strategy is discussed in section 3. Section 4 contains a description of the data. We present our results in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Theoretical Preliminaries
In this section, we explore the relationship between the bang-for-the-buck and the dividend tax rate under several alternative theories of corporate dividend policy. Each of these theories implies that dividend payout, y, other observable characteristics, w, and the tax rate, r, are related to the market valuation of the firm according to some function V(y,w,r). The "bang-for-the-buck" refers to the impact of dividends on valuation, per dollar of dividends. One natural measure of the average bang-for-the-buck is
Of course, one can also use V(y,w,r) as a measure of the marginal bang-for-the-buck.
Dividend Signaling
A careful reading of recent papers on dividend signaling reveals that an increase in the tax rate applicable to dividends has the effect of increasing the bang-for-the-buck. The purpose of this section is to exhibit this result in the context of a simple signaling model, and to argue that the principle should be reasonably general.
The basic intuition for the result is straightforward. In a standard dividend signaling model, high quality firms pay dividends in order to deter imitation by lower quality firms. Higher dividend taxes make dividends more costly. Consequently, a high quality firm does not need to pay as large a dividend in order to deter imitation. Thus, the firm manages to convey the same information but at a lower level of payout.
Unfortunately, the result is not quite so simple. Although the high quality firm pays a smaller dividend, the total costs associated with dividend payment may actually be larger due to the higher tax rate. Consequently, the equilibrium value of a high quality firm may fall as the tax rate risea. This implies that both the numerator and the denominator in equation (1) will decline --the ultimate impact on the bang-for-the-buck is not clear priori.
To show how these effects play out, we consider a simple model of dividend signaling, based loosely on Bhattacharya [1979) . We use 9 to denote the characteristics of the firm that are not publicly observable. 9 takes on values in the interval [9 ,9 ] . The fundamental value of a firm (that is, the L H value that it would command in a world of symmetric information) is given as a function of observable and unobservable characteristics, dividends, and dividend taxes. We will write this function as
V8(y,9,w,r) -v'(y,9,w) -ry S (where r is the tax rate applicable to dividends). Throughout, we take V"() to be differentiable in all of its arguments. To represent the notion that 9 denotes a higher level of quality than 9L' we assume that V > 0. Dividends are assumed to be costly, so V < 0 for r > 0. Finally, we will for simplicity assume that dividends are more costly on the margin to lower quality firms (VS9 > 0). Under this last assumption, our model satisfies the "single crossing property," which allows us to analyze signaling equilibria in the standard way. A failure of this property would not qualitatively alter our ultimate conclusion (see Bernheim [1991] ).
The quality parameter 9 is known only to the manager of the firm.
Investors observe the firm's other characteristics (a), its dividend (y), and the dividend tax rate (c). The market valuation must therefore depend only on y, co and r. We will write this valuation as V"(y,co,r). This function is produced endogenously as a consequence of the signaling equilibrium.
We assume that managers care both about current market value and their own assessment of value. The justification for this assumption is standard (see e.g. Bernheim [1991] ). In particular, the managerial objective function is given by
(3) V (y,co,r) + cV" (y,9,co,r) where m is some fixed parameter.
We solve for a separating equilibrium conditional upon the exogenous observables, a and r. Managers choose y to maximize (1). For each 9, the optimal choice of y satisfies
v"(y,w,r) + mV"(y,9,a,r) -0
In addition, equilibrium beliefs must be self-fulfilling. Thus, for any 9 and the corresponding optimal value of y, we must have (5) V(y,w,r) -V(y,9,c,r)
We differentiate (5) to obtain (6) V(y,w,v) -vS(y,e,,,r) + V(y,9,w,r)
Substitution of (6) into (4) yields d
(1-i-a) V(y,9,r)
9.. -______ v;(y.9,,,T) Equation (7) is recognizable as a first order differential equation. The solution, 9(y,w,r), must also satisfy the following initial condition: (8) 9(O,w,r) -9
Equation (8) is a consequence of the fact that firms are correctly identified as such in equilibrium; consequently, they have no reason to incur the costs associated with a positive dividend.
To assess the effect of dividend taxation on the average bang-for-the-buck, we need to evaluate V(y,w,i-). Unfortunately we have not been able to prove a general result concerning the sign of this derivative.
Instead, we will present a partial result and an example.
Suppose for the moment that V(y,c,r) > 0 for y 0. Then clearly, the marginal bang-for-the-buck rises with r. Moreover, since V(O,c,r) -V(0,,r') -V(O9,w0), the average bang-for-the-buck also rises with r.
If we can guarantee that V(y,w,r) > 0 only on some interval [0,] then, at a minimum, the average and marginal bang-for-the-buck rise with on this interval. Using equations (2), (5), and (7), it is possible to show that The intuition for this result is straightforward. Figure 1 depicts the function V'(y,w,r) for some fixed r and w. On the same diagram, we have superimposed an indifference curve (1) for the manager of a type 1 firm. In general, the equation for a type 6 indifference curve is given by
where C is some constant. V5(y,w,r) must he tangent to I at the point
where is the level of dividends selected by a type 1 firm.
Likewise, V(y,w,r) must be tangent to 'L' an indifference curve for the manager of a type 6 firm, at the point (ot V(O6wO)J. As r rises (to r'), the indifference curve for a 6 manager rotates upward around this point (to I'). To preserve the tangency property, V5(y,w,r) muat also rotate upwards (to V8(y,co,r')).
We now present an example designed to establish the proposition that the dividend signaling hypothesis can indeed produce the result that an increase in r raises the bang-for-the-buck globally. Suppose in particular that
Note that v' < 0, v > 0, and v5 > 0, so that V8(y,6,w t) has H y 6 ye all the properties required of it. After substituting (2) and (11) into (8),
we obtain dO (1+a)(co+r-9) dy -l+y Note that thia differential equation ia separable. It is therefore easy to verify that the solution to (12) is
where K depends on the constant of integration. From (8), it follows that Kw ÷ r. Using (2), (5), (11), and (13), we find that (14) V'(y,w,r) -
(w÷r)[l_(l÷y)_0]
From (14), it is evident that an increase in r raises both the marginal and average bang-for-the-buck for all values of y > 0.
This analysis does not rule out the possibility that, for some parameterizations, the bang-for-the-buck falls with r when y is sufficiently large. Nor does it rule this possibility out for theories of dividend signaling that are not captured by our simple model. Nevertheless, taken together with the existing literature on dividend signaling, it does suggest that a positive relationship between r and the bang-for-the-buck is the most natural consequence of the dividend signaling hypothesis. If the data point to a negative relationship, we should become at least somewhat skeptical about the validity of this hypothesis.
Alternative Hypotheses
In this section, we formulate a simple model of corporate dividend policy based upon a stylized representation of alternative "traditionalt' hypotheses,
and argue that this model is capable of explaining the existing evidence on dividend announcement effects. We then show that such a model implies that there should be an inverse relationship between the dividend tax rate and the bang-for-the -buck.
Since the alternative hypotheses do not concern the transmission of information, we drop the unobservable parameter e.
Thus, the fundamental value of the firm is given by:
V&(y,w,r)va(y,co) -ry
One csn think of the function Va(.) as summarizing the effect of dividends on managerial efficiency; alternatively, it could reflect shareholders' intrinsic preferences for dividends vs. retained earnings. In contrast to the signaling hypothesis, we asaume here that V() > 0, at least over some range. Thus, firma may pay dividends for their own sake, rather than to convey information. Since investors observe y, w, and c, the market valuation of this firm coincidea with its fundamental value: characteristics, a. However, we assume that dividend policy is not perfectly predictable, given knowledge of a and the function Va(.) (if it was perfectly predictable, then share price would not respond to dividend announcements, since announcements would be perfectly anticipated, and their implications capitalized into value). We represent this lack of perfect predictability by supplementing the managerial preference function with an additional parameter, o, that is determined randomly, and that is not publicly observed. Thus, managers act ss if they maximize some utility function, W(V,y,ca,a), where W > 0 and WY < 0. Managers must, of course, ohey the restriction that V -Vt(y,w,i-). The optimal choice of y is given hy yt(war)
Now we argue that this simple model can account for the central facts * concerning share price responses to dividend announcements. Since W < 0, managers will generally choose a level of dividends helow that which maximizes value. That is, Vt(ya(w,a,r),w,r) > 0. Consequently, innovations in a that increase y will tend to raise value (for fixed co and r), while innovations in a that reduce y will depress value. Since a is unobserved, share price will respond positively to the announcement of a dividend increase, and negatively to the announcement of a reduction.5
Although this class of hypotheses --which hold that dividends contribute directly to the vslue of the firm --are cspable of explaining the existing evidence on dividend announcement effects, their implications differ from those of dividend signaling models once the effect of dividend taxation on bang-for-the-buck is considered. From equations (15) and (16) In other words, both the average snd marginal bang-for-the-buck fall with r.
The intuition for this property is straightforward. Share price responds positively to dividends because shareholders value dividends (either for their own sake, or for their ebility to discipline managers). When dividends are taxed, shareholders like them less; this attenuates the positive effect of dividends on share price.
Related Observations
The analysis of sections 2. Under the alternative hypotheses, the bang-for-the-buck will tend to be low when observable information suggests that the marginal costs of paying dividenda is high (e.g. the firm has a low bond rating). This conclusion follows from the ssme considerations identified in section 2.2: when dividends are known to be more costly, shareholders like them less, and this attenuates the positive effect of dividends on share price.6
Our empirical analysis is designed to test between dividend signaling and the alternative hypotheses by examining the effects of kQth dividend taxation and observable firm characteristics (specifically, bond ratings) on the bang-for-the-buck. In the next section, we discuss our strategy for measuring the relationship between dividend tax rates (r) and the bang-for-the-buck. The reader should bear in mind that it is equally appropriate to interpret r as any publicly observed variable that is positively correlated with the marginal costs of paying dividends. Any factor that increases this marginal cost can, in a broad sense, be thought of as a dividend "tax."
Empiricsl Strategy
In the next section, we estimate the derivative of the market valuation function with respect to dividends (v(y,wr)J . We then examine the sign of to distinguish between signaling (V > 0) and the alternative hypotheses (V <0).
yl 6 Under the managerial discipline hypothesis, there is an additional reason to expect this result. Management is assumed to operate inefficiently when an organization has financial slack. Firms with high bond ratings typically have more slack. Thus, a given dividend should be more beneficial when bond ratings are high. One might object to this conclusion on the grounds that firms with low bond ratings are generally managed by individuals who are more inclined to place their own interests over those of the stockholders. This hypothesis strikes us as only marginally plausible.
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Estimates of V(y,w,r) are obtained by studying the effects of dividend announcements on share price. This is accomplished as follows. Let St denote the value of a firm's equity at time t, and let y, r, and a denote respectively the contemporaneous dividend announcement, dividend tax rate, and other pertinent information. Define the return as follows:
Using the fact that S -V(y,w,r), it is easy to verify that in other words, we simply move the term E[RIwr] to the left-hand side of equation (17). This comporta with common practice in the literature on the measurement of dividend announcement effects.
In practice, E[RIwr] is not observable. For the results reported here we simply use the concurrent return on a value-weighted market portfolio, R. When abnormal returns are calculated in this manner, they are usually referred to as "market adjusted returns" (see Brown and Warner (1985) ). 
where m is the marginal dividend tax rate at time t for investors in class it i, z is the accrual-equivalent capital gains tax rate at time t for investors in class i, c's is the tax rate on undistributed profits prevailing at time t, w are equity ownership weights, and s is the number of distinct shareholder classes. We obtained historical data on THETA from Poterba [1987] because of changes in the composition of stock ownership). Since most of the variation in 9 results from changes in the tax law, and since we omit dividend announcements that occurred close to the effective dates of major tax reforms (see below), it is unlikely that our analysis is significantly flawed by our failure to account for intra year variation in THETA.
Third, note that THETA is inversely related to the effective tax rate on dividends (m). It is important to bear this fact in mind when evaluating our empirical results. Under the signaling hypothesis, an increase in THETA should decrease the bang-for-the-buck; the alternative hypotheses imply that an increase in THETA should increase the bang-for-the-buck.
In section 2.3, we argued that, for the purpose of our analysis, one can think of any publicly observed factor that increases the marginal cost of paying dividends as a dividend "tax." It follows that one can also test the dividend signaling hypothesis against the alternatives by examining the relationships between bang-for-the-buck and other firm-specific characteristics. In this paper, we focus on bond ratings, which are summarized by the variable HIRATED . HIRATED is a dummy variable that it it takes on a value of 1 if firm i's bond rating is BE+ or better, and is equal to 0 if the bond rating is worse than 88+. Under the dividend signaling hypothesis, we expect to observe a greater bang-for-the-buck when HIRATED -0.
it Historical data on bond ratings were obtained from quarterly Compustat files. These data are available beginning in 1977. For years prior to 1977, we assumed that firm i's bond rating was equal to its 1977 value. To obtain some feel for the validity of this assumption, we examined changes in bond ratings between the earliest and latest dates for which Compustat data were available. It should be noted that these data span a 14-year period (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) . Over this period, roughly 97% of all firms did not experience changes in bond ratings large enough to alter their values of HIRATEO1. For a number of reasons, we also conducted our analysis of dividend announcement effects using a shorter sample period (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) that is completely covered by the Compustat files.
Even subsequent to 1977, Compustat does not contain information on bond ratings for all firms covered by the CRSP tapes. When bond ratings were not available, we imputed the value of HIRATED based on auxiliary regressions.9
Our empirical strategy also requires us to identify variables that summarize important aspects of publicly available information Obviously, the market has access to a great deal of information on virtually every publicly traded company. In our analysis, it is important to control for variables that ought to affect the market's interpretation of a dividend announcement.
If a company has experienced substantial share price appreciation since its last dividend change, the market may regard the announcement of a dividend increase as an effort to keep pace, rather than as an attempt to signal fundamentally new information. Likewise, if there has been substantial inflation since a company last changed its dividend, the announcement of an Each auxiliary regression explained HIRATED as a function of the other independent variables. We estimated the auxiliary regressions using subsamples for which complete data were available. increase might be interpreted as an adjustment for inflation. To control for these factors, we introduce the variables CR0 and INFL • which represent, it it respectively, the growth in share price and the CPI since firm i's lest dividend change.
The amount of time that has elapsed since a company's last dividend change may also color the market's reaction to the announcement of an increase. A given change in dividends may be more significant for companies that rarely alter dividend policy, than for companies that have changed dividends frequently. To account for this possibility, we introduce the variable MONTHS which is defined as the length of time (in months) between t and t' , where (as before) t' is the date of firm i's most recent dividend change prior to date t.
Finally, it is conceivable that share price responses to dividend announcements may vary with current macroeconomic conditions. For example, a dividend increase may be a more persuasive signal of good prospects during a recession than during a boom. To allow for this possibility, we include the variable CAP, which measures seasonally adjusted capacity utilization in the manufacturing sector for the month in which the dividend announcement (at time t) took place. Note that, in contrast to THETA, CAP varies monthly, rather than annually.
We If fi < 0, higher dividend taxation increases the bang-for-the-buck, as predicted by the dividend signaling hypothesis. One can also perform a comparable test based on bond ratings by examining fi.
These specifications were estimated with OLS, using White's [1980] method of calculating heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errorsJ° From our basic sample covering the 1962-1988 period, we excluded observations for a number of reasons.
First, to construct several independent variables, we required data on a prior dividend change. Consequently, we were forced to drop the first dividend announcement for each firm.
Second, we excluded all dividend announcements occurring in close proximity to major shifts in tax policy. During our sample period, there were two instances of tax reform that significantly altered the relative taxation of dividends and capital gains. The first occurred in 1981, the second in 1986. Theory suggests that a given change in dividends may convey different information, depending upon whether it occurs in response to a change in tax regime, or to other factors. In particular, the distribution of y conditional on w and r may be different when tax policy has just changed (and firms are adjusting to the new regime) than when the current tax policy 10 The use of White's correction is particularly appropriate given the fact that HIRATED is imputed for some observations. it 21 has persisted for some time. We handled this ptoblem by dropping dividend announcements occurring in one-year windows centered around January 1, 1982 and January 1, 1987 (exclusion criterion "A"). We examined the sensitivity of our results to alternative selection criteria. We also report here results based upon the alternative criterion of dropping the first dividend change for each firm after the two major shifts in tax policy (exclusion criterion "8").
We also estimated (but do not report) regressions in which no observations were excluded for this reason; the results were similar.
Some previous studies of dividend announcement effects also exclude observations for which earnings announcements occur in close proximity to dividend announcements. This is important when one's purpose is to measure the absolute level of abnormal returns on dividend announcement dates. Our object is to examine how the sensitivity of abnormal returns to dividends varies with observable factors that are correlated with the marginal cost of dividends. There is no particular reason to believe that the bias created by including observations with earnings announcement conflicts is systematically related to tax regimes or bond ratings. Thus, we estimate one set of regressions in which no exclusions are made for this reason.
To ascertain the extent to which our results might be affected by the inclusion of observations with earnings announcement conflicts, we also estimated a set of regressions in which these observations were removed from the sample. Unfortunately, the available data on earnings announcements begin in 1978. Thus, when excluding observations with earnings announcement conflicts, we also dropped all dividend announcements occurring before 1978.11 At several points in this discussion, we mentioned that our results are not particularly sensitive to alternative (unreported) estimation strategies, such as the use of different specifications, sample definitions, and exclusion criteria. We also experimented with variable definitions, and continued to obtain similar results. The regressions presented in the next section were chosen because they exemplify the robust patterns exhibited by a much larger set of estimates.
Results
Regreasion results for the 1962 through 1988 sample period are reported in Table 1 . Table 2 contains results for the 1978-1988 aample, where earnings announcement conflicts have been removed. For our purposes, the coefficients of primary interest are those associated with tDIV, ADIVTHETA, and
ADIVHIRATED. An inspection of these coefficients reveals two robust patterns.
First, the coefficients of ADIVTHETA are negative and estimated quite precisely. In each of the eight regressions, the asaociated t-atatistic exceeds 2; in most cases it exceeds 2.5. These coefficients imply that an increase in the dividend tax rate raises the bang-for-the-buck (V > 0) for firms with low bond ratings. This finding is consistent with the dividend signaling hypothesis, and inconsistent with the alternatives outlined in section 2.
Second, the coefficients of EsDIVHIRATED ere all negative. Table 1 the estimated values of these coefficients are not statistically significant at conventional levels of confidence. Mote significant effects --both economically and statistically --are found in Table 2 . This is to be expected, since all bond ratings prior to 1977 are imputed. The effect of a high bond rating on the bang-for-the-buck is both negative and statistically significant (at conventional levels) in equations 1 and 3 of Table 2 . Statistical significance is somewhat lower in equations 2 and 4.
Unfortunstely, in
Aa we have argued in section 2.3, a negative relationship between bond rating and bang-for-the-buck also argues in favor of the dividend signaling hypothesis. In effect, an increase in the marginal cost of paying dividends arising from an observable deterioration of a firm's financial condition is analogous to an increase in the marginal coat of dividends arising from an increase in the dividend tax rate. Under the signaling hypothesis and the alternatives, the effect of a decline in bond rating should therefore be compareble to the effect of an increase in the tax rate. Thus, the evidence on the effect of bond ratings contained in Tables I and 2 offers qualified support for the dividend signaling hypothesis.
As a plausibility check on the estimates in Tables 1 and 2, we have also calculated the bang-for-the-buck (the derivative of the excess return with respect to tDIV), evaluated at the mean values of the other independent variables. The resulting estimates of bang-for-the-buck, along with their associated standard errors, are presented in the final row of these tables.
For example, the estimates in the second column of Table 1 imply that a one percentage point increase in the ratio of dividends to share price raises the abnormal return over the announcement window by 3.28 percentage points. Note that this effect is estimated with great precision in all of the to decline over the sample period, our effort to measure tax effects could conceivably pick up some spurious trend. We are inclined to doubt this hypothesis for two reasons. First, the evidence on tax effects is corroborated by evidence on bond ratings, and bond ratings vary considerably across firms. Second, the most plausible explanation for a spurious trend suggests that our estimates should be biased against the dividend signaling hypothesis. During the l980s, domestic firma faced increasing levels of competition from abroad. Casual evidence suggests that, as a result, investors became more sensitive to managerial inefficiency. Thus, in the absence of signaling, one would have expected to observe an increase in the bang-for-the-buck during the 1980s.
It is also possible to teat directly the hypothesis that the evolution of the bang-for-the-buck through time results from changes in the tax regime, rather than from some other consideration. We refer the reader to figure 2 for a schematic depiction of our testing strategy. In this figure, the sampling period is divided into the 3 tax regimes. The second regime is further subdivided into two subregimes, ha and lIb. We propose performing teats for structural change across regimes and subregimea. Teat 1 examines whether the relationship governing exceaa returns is the same in regime I as in regime ha. Test 2 examinea the atsbility of the excess return relationship over regimes ha and lib. Teat 3 compares the estimated relationahipa for regimes hlb and III. Each of these compariaona involves a joint teat for the equality of 12 coefficient pairs. Under the hypothesis that the evolution of the excess return relationship is driven by changes in the tax regime, we would expect to obtain the following reaults:
Teat 1: Reject equality of coefficienta Test 2: Do not reject equality of coefficients Teat 3: Reject equality of coefficienta Under the alternative hypothesis that the evolution of the excess return relationship is driven by spurious factors, one would not expect to obtsin the same pattern of results, except by some improbably coincidence. If, for example, the process of change was relatively smooth, one would expect to obtain roughly similar test statistics for tests 1, 2, and 3. Each joint hypothesis might or might not be rejected; the key point is that there would not be a dramatic, systematic difference in the test statistics across the three joint hypotheses.
One might object that the data are more likely to reject test 1, for two reasons. First, although regimes ha, lib, and III are all roughly of the same duration, regime I is roughly twice as long. If there is a spurious trend, then there will be less similarity between behavior in regime Ia (the first half of regime I) and regime ha than between behavior in regimes ha and hib, since the temporal separation between regimes Ia and lie is greater than that between regimes ha and lib. Second, since regime I is longer, it contains substantially more data. This implies that the coefficients will be estimated more precisely. If any change occurs through time, greater precision makes rejection more likely.
*
We address this objection by performing a fourth test (test I ), whtch examines the stability of the excess return relationship over regimes lb and Ila. Since regime lb is roughly of the same duration as regimes lie, hhb, and III, the basis for the objection is eliminated.
Results are contained in Table 4 . Tests 1 and 1* decisively reject the hypothesis of structural stability at the 99% level of confidence. Test 3 also rejects the hypothesis of structural stability at that 95% level of confidence. In sharp contrast, the F-statistic for test 2 is actually less than unity. Thus, there is strong evidence that the relationship of interest changed significantly between regimes I and II, and between regimes II and III, but that this relationship remained remarkably steble during regime II. This is precisely the pattern that would emerge if the evolution of the relationship for excess returns was primarily driven by changes in the tax system, end it differs sharply from the pattern that one would expect to find if the evolution of the relationship for excess returns was primarily driven by other factors.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that the dividend signaling hypothesis implies that abnormal returns should be more sensitive to the magnitude of announced dividend changes when observable factors (such as tax rates and bond ratings) suggest that the marginal costs of dividends are high. Plausible alternative hypotheses have the opposite implication. Our empirical investigation reveals thet the "bang-for-the-buck" generated by dividend announcements rises with the dividend tax rate and fells with bond rating.
These findings are favorable to the signaling hypothesis.
Our tests emphasize implications of signaling that do not appear to be particularly model-specific. Consequently, it may be possible to adapt our approsch in order to test signaling models in other contexts. For example, one might test the hypothesis that education functions as a signal of ability by identifying observable employee characteristics that are systematically correlated with the costs of obtsining education. Under the signaling hypothesis, the returns to sdditional education should be higher for those individuals whose observable costs of education are also high. (1) Standard errors in parentheses
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(2) Bang-for-the-buck is calculated at the mean values of the independent variables for the 1962 -1988 period. Notes:
(1) Standard errors in parentheses
(2) Bang-for-the-buck is calculated at the mean values of the independent variables for the 1978 -1988 period, except for HIRATED, which is set equal to zero.
